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When Popular Decisions Rest on Shaky Foundations: 
Systemic Implications of Selected WTO Appellate Body Trade 
Remedies Jurisprudence 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When former Appellate Body member Professor Mitsuo Matsushita gives general 
remarks at a conference, he often recounts, in highly amusing detail, a story about 
when, early in the history of the WTO, he and fellow Appellate Body members were 
called upon to consider the appeal in the Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case.1 
At issue in that case was, inter alia, whether vodka and shochu (a Japanese alcohol) 
are ‘like products’ pursuant to the first sentence of GATT Article III:2. Professor 
Matsushita humorously explains that the seven Appellate Body members felt 
compelled to ‘do a little field work,’ and arranged a taste test for themselves to 
compare vodka and shochu.2 While this tale may or may not reflect the actual actions 
of the Appellate Body members, it could be understood to include an implicit 
suggestion that ‘real world’ context and experience are relevant to determining 
likeness. 
We see a similar message — this time documented explicitly in an Appellate 
Body report — in the European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
                                                 
 It is my great pleasure to contribute this chapter in honour of my mentor and friend, Professor Mitsuo 
Matsushita. Professor Matsushita has expressed interest in and been supportive of my scholarship since 
our first meeting at a 2006 conference in Australia. We have had many interesting discussions over the 
years, but have particularly shared an interest in the applicability of economic principles to issues 
arising in WTO dispute settlement, and in disputes with popular outcomes but for which we may not 
have agreed with the reasoning. I therefore felt the focus of this chapter would be fitting as a tribute to 
Matsushita-sensei. 
1 Appellate Body Report, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcohol), WT/DS8, 10, 
11/AB/R, 4 October 1996. Japan — Alcohol was only the second appeal to be heard by the Appellate 
Body. 
2 The Appellate Body hears appeals in divisions of three, but all seven members consult and discuss 
each appeal. Thus while Professor Matsushita was not on the division assigned to the Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages dispute, he would have participated in discussions regarding the issues in the 
dispute. 
Products (Hormones) dispute.3 In discussing how to assess the risk to humans of 
treating cattle with growth hormones, the Appellate Body wrote one of the most 
famous lines in WTO jurisprudence: ‘It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is 
to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 [of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures] is not only risk ascertainable in 
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in 
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse 
effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die.’4 
Although Justice Feliciano has indicated publicly that he penned this line, Professor 
Matsushita also participated on this division and I am therefore taking the liberty of 
inferring his agreement with the sentiment.5 
The instinct to look to the real world for context of course also finds support in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Article 3.2 indicates the dispute 
settlement system ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’.6 The 
Appellate Body made clear in its first appeal that ‘customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law’ included Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT),7 explaining that the ‘general rule of interpretation [in VCLT 
Article 31] has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law. 
As such, it forms part of the “customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law”’ which the Appellate Body has been directed to apply.8 Article 31(1) provides 
that: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.’9 
In practice, particularly in certain trade remedies cases, the Appellate Body has 
not been consistent in applying Article 31 of the VCLT and considering the context of 
                                                 
3 Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (EC – Hormones), WT/DS/26, 48/AB/R, 16 January 1998. 
4 ibid 72. 
5 The Appellate Body division responsible for the EC – Hormones case consisted of Justice Feliciano 
(presiding), Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Professor Matsushita. 
6 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 15 April 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, art 3.2. 
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
8 Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, 17 (footnote omitted). The Appellate Body similarly indicated the 
applicability of VCLT Article 32 in Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 
1) 10 (‘[t]here can be no doubt that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with the role of 
supplementary means of interpretation, has also attained the same status’), and of the provisions of 
VCLT Article 33 in a series of later cases. See Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the 
WTO Appellate Body’ (2010) 21 Eur J Intl L 605, 608 n 4. 
9 VCLT, art 31(1). 
the relevant treaty text in light of its object and purpose, and has instead either been 
overly mechanistic in its textual interpretation or has strayed from the text, seemingly 
in favour of an outcome-based result. Part I of this chapter will discuss the appropriate 
role context should play in interpreting the WTO agreements. Parts II through IV will 
critique aspects of the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence in the zeroing cases; the 1916 
Act dispute; and the early safeguards cases, as generating interpretive difficulties by 
failing to give enough attention to real-world context and object and purpose.10 Part V 
will explore possible reasons for these departures by the Appellate Body from a 
contextualised textual analysis, and identify some systemic implications of these 
decisions. 
II. HOW SHOULD THE COVERED AGREEMENTS BE 
INTERPRETED? 
The DSU provides guidance as to how the dispute settlement panels and Appellate 
Body should approach interpreting the covered agreements. Of particular relevance 
are Articles 3.2, 11 and 19.2, which address, inter alia, how treaty interpretation and 
reviews of domestic conduct should be conducted. 
A. Context and Object and Purpose 
As noted above, Article 3.2 requires reference to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
to ensure provisions are clarified in accordance with public international law rules of 
treaty interpretation, and Article 19.2 cautions that ‘the panel and Appellate Body 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided for in the covered 
agreements’.11 
In adjudicating in accordance with the VCLT, the drafting history of the VCLT 
emphasises a preference for a textual, rather than a teleological, approach to treaty 
interpretation.12 However, ‘textual’ does not mean that the words of the text are of 
sole relevance. Indeed, Article 31 of the VCLT additionally requires consideration of 
context and the terms’ object and purpose. Article 31 provides: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
                                                 
10 Because this chapter aims to provide a macro-level critique, the cases are summarised briefly rather 
than described in detail. 
11 DSU, art 19.2. 
12 Michael Lennard, ‘Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements’ (2002) 5 J Intl Econ 
L 17, 20-22. 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. (emphasis added) 
Thus while WTO treaty analysis must begin with the actual text, ‘[t]his is only a 
starting point. The reference to the object and purpose and the context confirms that 
interpretation is not well served if it does not consider other elements besides the text 
of the treaty’.13 
The Appellate Body has considered context and object and purpose in a variety of 
cases14 but it has not done so consistently. For example, in EC – Chicken Cuts, the 
Appellate Body, in interpreting the meaning of ‘salted’ in the European Communities’ 
tariff schedule, considered context under both Article 31(1) and 31(2). Its analysis 
pursuant to VCLT Article 31(2) was particularly extensive, spanning nearly 50 
paragraphs. 15  With respect to Article 31(1), the Appellate Body approved of the 
Panel’s determination that ‘factual context’ is a part of the ordinary meaning.16 This 
suggests an intent to interpret ‘ordinary meaning’ with reference to context rather than 
solely the dictionary definition.17 The Appellate Body also characterised the treaty 
interpretation process as a ‘holistic exercise that should not be mechanically 
subdivided into rigid components’.18 
In contrast to its focus on context and taking a holistic approach thereto in 
Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body has in other cases, particularly certain trade 
                                                 
13 Van Damme (n 8) 620. 
14 ibid 622. 
15  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts (EC – Chicken Cuts), WT/DS269, 286/AB/R, September, 2005), paras 188-235. 
16 ibid para 187. 
17 Van Damme (n 8) 626. 
18 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (n 15) para 176. Even in EC – Chicken Cuts, however, 
the Appellate Body examined ‘context’ completely separate from ‘object and purpose’, see Henrik 
Horn and Robert L Howse, ‘European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts’ (2008) 7 World Trade Rev 9, 15. A more holistic approach to context would not assess 
these two elements entirely separately. 
remedies disputes, seemed either to assess context in an overly mechanistic way19 or 
to ignore the Vienna Convention altogether. 
B. Standard of Review 
In addition to taking into account context and object and purpose, the panels and 
Appellate Body also need to determine the appropriate standard of review to apply in 
assessing the measures they are reviewing. DSU Article 11 provides the following 
general guidance20 on the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a Member’s 
measure: ‘a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, 
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements.’ 
The Appellate Body has stated that the appropriate standard under Article 11 
‘must be considered in light of the obligations of the particular covered agreement at 
issue in order to derive the more specific contours of the appropriate standard of 
review’.21 Ross Becroft has argued that ‘where there has been a prior national-level 
process, such as in trade remedy matters, this approach should result in a more 
deferential standard being applied’.22 However, the Appellate Body has not applied a 
more deferential standard of review in trade remedies cases, but has instead repeatedly 
criticised panels in such cases for failing to conduct a sufficiently rigorous review of 
the underlying evidence.23 Furthermore, the Appellate Body has essentially ignored 
the more deferential standard of review required by the Anti-dumping Agreement.24 
The Parts below elaborate upon the concerns described in this introduction. 
III. THE ZEROING CASES 
As many readers will know, the WTO dispute settlement system has addressed the 
permissibility of zeroing, a methodology used in calculating antidumping duties, on 
numerous occasions.25 These cases have generated significant controversy because of 
                                                 
19  See eg, Federico Ortino, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – 
Gambling: A Critique’ (2006) 9 J Intl Econ L 117, 131 (critiquing Appellate Body’s assessment of 
context as being overly mechanistic); Lennard (n 12) 23 (analysis should involve a holistic approach 
rather than being conducted robotically). 
20  As will be discussed below, the Anti-dumping Agreement contains its own agreement-specific 
standard of review provision, Article 17.6 (ii). 
21 Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, 27 June 2006, para 184. 
22 Ross Becroft, ‘The WTO Standard of Review: A Means to Strengthen the Trading System’ in Susy 
Frankel and Meredith Kolsky Lewis (eds), Trade Agreements at the Crossroads (Routledge 2014) 70. 
23 ibid 70-71. 
24 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-dumping Agreement), 15 April 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201, art 17.6 (ii). 
25 For purposes of this chapter, no understanding of zeroing is required. For an explanation of the 
methodology and different contexts in which it has been challenged, see Meredith Kolsky Lewis, 
‘Dissent as Dialectic: Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2012) 48 
Stan J Intl L 1, 18-19. 
the level of disagreement between the panels and Appellate Body on the merits, and 
because it took many years and lost cases before the United States largely ceased the 
practice of zeroing.26 This Part will focus on the former. 
On the surface, the zeroing cases might appear straightforward and to raise no 
cause for concern. The Appellate Body has never found any use of zeroing to be 
permissible, and, following an early case involving the European Union,27 the United 
States has been the sole respondent in the many separate disputes challenging zeroing 
in a host of contexts. Zeroing is widely reviled as a practice, as its use will almost 
always result in higher antidumping margins. However, these cases merit attention 
because the reasoning applied therein raises a number of concerns. While the 
Appellate Body has never upheld the use of zeroing, several dispute settlement panels 
determined that at least some forms of zeroing were permissible, and two panels so 
found even after the Appellate Body had found such zeroing to be impermissible in 
earlier disputes.28 Eventually the Appellate Body encouraged panels, in the name of 
security and predictability, to stop fighting this fight, and panels indeed began 
following the Appellate Body’s decisions.29 However, the initial level of disagreement 
between the panels and the Appellate Body was, and remains, unprecedented.30 
The Anti-dumping Agreement contemplates three ways to compare prices, and in 
which zeroing could therefore theoretically be used: 
[T]he existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall 
normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average 
normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export 
transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted 
average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions 
[under certain elaborated conditions] . . . .31 
                                                 
26 The US change in policy was reported in the Federal Register in 2012. See Antidumping Proceedings: 
Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping 
Duty Proceedings; Final Modification, 77 Fed. Reg. 8101 (14 February 2012). See also Sungjoon Cho, 
‘No More Zeroing? The United States Changes its Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO’ (9 
March 2012) 16(8) Am Socy Intl L Insights. 
27 Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Anti-Dumping Duties on Cotton-Type Bed Linen 
from India, WT/DS141/AB/R, 1 March 2001. 
28 See Panel Report, United States — Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US – Zeroing 
(Japan)), WT/DS322/R, 20 September 2006; Panel Report, United States — Final Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)), WT/DS344/R, 20 December 
2007. 
29 Appellate Body Report, United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, 30 April 2008, para 160. 
30 See Lewis (n 25) 19-21. 
31 Anti-dumping Agreement, art 2.4.2. 
From the earliest cases, there was primarily agreement that Article 2.4.2 prohibited 
zeroing in the weighted average to weighted average (WA-WA) context. The 
disagreement centred over whether the above provision also prohibited zeroing when 
transactions were compared to transactions (T-T) or a weighted averaged was 
compared to separate transactions (WA-T). In the four cases leading up to the 
Appellate Body signalling the debate should end, 11 of 12 panellists found zeroing in 
the T-T and/or W-T context to be permissible, while the divisions of the Appellate 
Body unanimously found in each case that such zeroing was impermissible.32 
Before turning to the merits, it bears noting that the Anti-dumping Agreement 
requires a more deferential standard of review than DSU art. 11. Article 17.6(ii) 
provides: ‘the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where 
the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one 
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in 
conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible 
interpretations.’33 
Thus the Anti-dumping Agreement contemplates that there may be provisions that 
could be subject to more than one permissible interpretation. In such a case, the 
adjudicators should defer to the interpretation of the domestic authorities, if it is based 
on one of the permissible interpretations.34 Some have argued that Article 17.6 (ii) 
was intended to require deference akin to the so-called Chevron deference that US 
courts apply in administrative law cases.35 This narrative would be consistent with the 
understanding, expressed by several scholars, that Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping 
Agreement was drafted by the United States in order to imbed precisely this type of 
deference into the ADA.36 While others have rejected the notion that Article 17.6(ii) 
was intended to build Chevron-style deference into the Agreement per se, 37  it is 
                                                 
32 For a discussion of these cases and the level of disagreement, see Lewis (n 25) 19-22. 
33 Anti-dumping Agreement, art 17.6(ii). 
34 See Van Damme (n 8) 609. 
35 Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the 
Supreme Court held that in interpreting statutes that mandate agency action, courts should give 
deference to the implementing agencies’ interpretations of said statutes unless those interpretations are 
unreasonable. 
36 See eg, Roger P Alford, ‘Reflections on US – Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the 
WTO Appellate Body’ (2006) 45 Colum J Transnatl L 196, 200-02. 
37 See eg, Sungjoon Cho, ‘The World Trade Constitutional Court’ (2009) Faculty Scholarship Paper No 
182, 27 <http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/182> accessed 7 September 2015; Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, ‘Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO: Some Similarities and Differences’ 
(2004) 36 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 587, 603-04; Steven P Croley and John H Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute 
Procedures, Standards of Review, and Deference to National Governments’ (1996) 90 Am J Intl L 193, 
205-06. 
difficult to argue with the proposition that Article 17.6(ii) requires some level of 
deference.38 
Without delving into the arguments made by the panels and Appellate Body, the 
fact that four panels in a row (each of which featured one or more panellists with 
extensive trade remedies experience) read Article 2.4.2 to permit the zeroing 
methodology at issue, would seem like strong evidence either that (a) the panels had 
the only correct interpretation; or (b) there were two permissible interpretations. As to 
the former, the panels in the later two disputes identified flaws in the reasoning of the 
Appellate Body in the two earlier disputes, 39  including noting that the Appellate 
Body’s reading of Article 2.4.2 as prohibiting zeroing in all instances would render 
the WA-WA and WA-T methodologies the same and thus render the third sentence 
inutile.40 In the US – Zeroing (Japan) appeal, the Appellate Body disagreed with this 
assessment but did little to clarify its own analysis.41 With respect to the latter, the 
Appellate Body rejected the notion that the large number of panellists’ reading of 
Article 2.4.2 could be correct; it has never found multiple permissible interpretations 
of the Anti-dumping Agreement, and has effectively read Article 17.6(ii) out of the 
Agreement. 42  Isabelle Van Damme has commented that rather than looking for 
permissible interpretations, ‘[t]he Appellate Body seeks the “proper” or “correct” 
interpretation, not any “permissible” interpretation . . . . A right interpretation is not 
the same as a possible interpretation; and a possible interpretation is not the same as 
the better or best answer to an interpretive problem’.43 
Although WTO Members are probably pleased with the Appellate Body’s zeroing 
jurisprudence, they should instead have some concerns. Particularly in its early 
zeroing decisions, the Appellate Body did not base its decisions on a clearly textual 
VCLT analysis, but instead relied on the concept of ‘the product as a whole’ [as the 
only acceptable basis for assessing dumping, rather than looking at individual 
transactions], which does not appear in the Anti-dumping Agreement but was instead 
an argument raised in the European Communities’ written submissions. 44  This 
                                                 
38 See eg, Andrew T Guzman, ‘Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO Disputes’ 
(2009) 42 Cornell Intl LJ 45, 75 (‘Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement reflects the decision of the 
member states that panels should refrain from aggressive review of anti-dumping measures.’). 
39 The Appellate Body’s decision in the Appellate Body Report, United States — Laws, Regulations 
and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (‘Zeroing’) (US – Zeroing (EC)), 
WT/DS294/AB/R, 18 April 2006 dispute was particularly deficient, relying largely on its own prior 
reports rather than conducting a VCLT analysis of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 
40 Panel Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (n 28) paras 7.136-43. 
41 See Tania Voon, ‘The End of Zeroing? Reflections Following the WTO Appellate Body’s Latest 
Missive’ (2007) 34 Legal Issues Econ Integration 211, 225. 
42 In some instances it has declined to accept that there was more than one permissible interpretation of 
the treaty text; in others it has simply ignored Article 17.6(ii). See Van Damme (n 8) 610. See also 
Voon (n 41) 219 (Article 17.6(ii) has arguably been rendered a dead letter). 
43 Van Damme (n 8) 610. 
44 See Lewis (n 25) 37. 
nontextual and noncontextual approach runs afoul of DSU Article 3.2 and erodes 
security and predictability. 
The Appellate Body’s failure to give effect to Article 17.6 (ii) of the ADA 
similarly reflects a blinkered approach that has disregarded context and object and 
purpose. The Anti-dumping Agreement is the only WTO agreement to have a separate 
standard of review, and it is a notably deferential standard. Reading this standard out 
of the Agreement is inappropriate, even if applying it would mean fewer measures 
were struck down. That is the bargain Members struck in their negotiations, and the 
Appellate Body should not disregard it. Doing so arguably violates DSU Article 19.2 
by diminishing Members’ rights under the covered agreements.  
Finally, the Appellate Body’s approach in the zeroing decisions discussed above 
may complicate the Organization’s efforts to complete future agreements. The Rules 
negotiations in the Doha Round have included efforts by the United States to make it 
explicit that zeroing is permitted.45 Even if the US backs down on this issue, it seems 
highly likely that it will insist on more precise, exacting language in future 
agreements. Given that a degree of fuzzy language is often necessary to get all parties 
comfortable enough to conclude an international treaty, this should be a matter of 
concern for other Members. 
IV. THE 1916 ACT CASE — BLURRING TRADE AND 
ANTITRUST? 
The second instance in which the Appellate Body has reached a popular result 
without necessarily taking into account relevant contextual considerations is its 
decision in the United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 dispute. 46  On initial 
impression, this case raised few eyebrows. The law in question, which provided a 
private right of action (as well as the possibility of government action) for predatory 
international price discrimination, had not been invoked successfully in its over 
eighty-year history, and the US government did not particularly care whether or not it 
remained on the books. At the same time, the few instances where courts had left open 
the possibility that the right case could be successful against foreign defendants who 
                                                 
45  These efforts began early in the zeroing saga. In the 2007 draft chairperson’s text relating to 
antidumping and subsidies, provisions were included specifying the permissibility of zeroing in a 
number of contexts. See WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD 
and SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213, 30 November 2007. The United States was reportedly 
dissatisfied that the draft did not go further in permitting zeroing, whereas other delegations objected to 
any authorisation of zeroing at all. See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
‘Divisions Persist on Anti-Dumping Draft Text’ (30 January 2008) 12(3) Bridges 
<http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/divisions-persist-on-anti-dumping-draft-text> 
accessed 7 September 2015; WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the Chairman, 
TN/RL/W/254, 21 April 2011, 6 (noting wide divide amongst members on the issue of zeroing). 
46 Appellate Body Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, 28 August 
2000. 
had had antidumping duties levied against them in US administrative proceedings 
(pursuant to an entirely different statute), was enough to cause consternation amongst 
trading partners. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body’s approach to this dispute seems 
again to have been somewhat outcome-driven, without fully taking into account the 
relevant context. 
The 1916 Act (although the statute is often referred to as the Antidumping Act of 
1916, its official name is ‘Title VIII of the United States Revenue Act of 1916’47 and 
the Act itself does not use the words ‘dumping’ or ‘antidumping’) made it illegal to 
‘commonly and systematically . . . cause to be imported and sold . . . articles within 
the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market price or wholesale 
price . . . in the principal markets of the country of . . . exportation . . . provided, that 
such act . . . be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United 
States . . . or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade . . . in such articles in the 
United States’.48 The 1916 Act was a penal statute, with imprisonment a possible 
penalty, alongside fines. Private parties could also seek treble damages.49 
One of the major issues in the dispute was whether the 1916 Act regulated 
dumping, in which case it arguably violated the mandate of GATT Article VI by 
providing remedies for dumping other than antidumping duties (the 1916 Act 
provided for the possibility of criminal fines and treble damages), or regulated 
anticompetitive behaviour in the sense of an antitrust statute. The panel and Appellate 
Body both concluded the Act regulated dumping. Also at issue was whether the 
petitioners could challenge the Act ‘as such’ (since it had never been successfully 
invoked). This issue hinged upon whether the United States Justice Department had 
discretion in enforcing the law or whether it was mandatory legislation. On this issue, 
the Appellate Body deemed the Act mandatory, and thus susceptible to an ‘as such’ 
challenge. 
On the first issue, the Appellate Body seems to have discounted context in its 
assessment. While the international price discrimination regulated by the Act has an 
overlap with antidumping in that antidumping also regulates selling more cheaply in a 
foreign market than in the home market, the Act’s predatory intent requirement is 
more reminiscent of an antitrust law than an antidumping rule. In addition, the 
remedies, including treble damages, were consistent with those found in the US 
antitrust laws. Indeed, the Act appeared50 alongside the US antitrust laws, in Title 15 
of the United States code, in a chapter immediately following a chapter entitled 
‘Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade.’ The chapter in which the Act 
                                                 
47 Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat 756 (1916); 15 U.S.C. s 72 (2004). 
48 Revenue Act of 1916, s 801. 
49 ibid. 
50 As a result of the WTO rulings, the Act was repealed in 2004. 15 U.S.C. s 72 (2004). 
featured is called Federal Trade Commission; Promotion of Export Trade and 
Prevention of Unfair Methods of Competition. Thus the 1916 Act is not in Title 19 of 
the US code, which is where the US trade laws that explicitly address antidumping 
have been located, including the Anti-dumping Act of 1921 (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq. and 
the current law, Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. ch.4). Title 
19 also contains the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. ch 12), which houses, 
inter alia, the US safeguards law and the provisions establishing the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative. 
For most of the Act’s existence, it was understood to be an antitrust statute.51 The 
Act was little-used because other laws existed to remedy anticompetitive, predatory 
conduct (eg the Sherman Act), and it was not used to combat dumping due to the 
required showing of predatory intent and the availability of the Anti-Dumping Act of 
1921 and later Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, both of which addressed dumping 
directly and did not require a showing of predatory intent.52 
Those who wished to use the Act to remedy antidumping quickly determined that 
the statutory requirements made it too difficult to take action. Thus there were almost 
immediate steps to enact an administrative mechanism to address dumping, which 
resulted in the Antidumping Act of 1921.53 The 1916 Act has been deemed ‘a dead 
letter almost from its enactment’54 and the efforts to bring actions under the Act were 
few and far between. The first courts that had occasion to interpret the Act treated it as 
an antitrust statute.55 It was not until the late 1990s that two courts left open the 
possibility that the 1916 Act could be invoked by petitioners who had succeeded in 
administrative antidumping proceedings. It was these opinions that sparked the EC 
and Japan to challenge the 1916 Act as such (rather than as applied).56 In the end, only 
                                                 
51 See eg, Jeffrey L Kessler, ‘The Antidumping Act of 1916: Antitrust Analogue or Anathema?’ (1986) 
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54 See Harvey M. Applebaum, ‘The Antidumping Laws – Impact on the Competitive Process’ (1974) 
43 Antitrust LJ 590, 591. 
55 See eg, Zenith Radio Corporation v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 494 F Supp 1190 (ED 
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56 Geneva Steel Co v Ranger Steel Supply Corp, 980 F Supp 1209 (D Utah 1997); Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel Corp v Mitsui & Co, 26 F Supp 2d 1022 (SD Ohio 1998). 
one plaintiff ever succeeded in obtaining damages under the 1916 Act, ironically in 
litigation commenced after the initiation of the WTO proceedings.57 
Although the panel and Appellate Body decided that the 1916 Act could be 
applied to remedy dumping as well as antitrust violations, it seems unlikely that this 
was the original legislative intent: ‘it is very rare that a violation of the antidumping 
law also would be a violation of antitrust law.’58 
To the extent the Act regulated a type of dumping that rose to the level of  
predatory conduct, it would have better respected the separate objectives of unfair 
trade laws and competition laws to view the Act as addressing a type of anti-
competitive conduct falling within the antitrust sphere. Reading the 1916 Act as an 
antidumping measure rather than an antitrust statute could encroach upon countries’ 
ability to enforce aspects of their antitrust laws.59 Deeming provisions designed to 
provide antitrust remedies to be contrary to the Antidumping Agreement effectively 
removes the availability of those remedies for their intended purpose.60 As Professor 
Matsushita has explained, it is entirely possible based on the WTO’s 1916 Act 
jurisprudence that WTO Members could complain about a variety of other antitrust-
focused statutes, thus encroaching upon Members’ ability to regulate anticompetitive 
conduct.61 For example, the United States’ Robinson-Patman Act62  is an antitrust 
statute that regulates injurious, unjustified price discrimination and, like US antitrust 
laws generally, applies extraterritorially. The remedies for violating the Robinson-
Patman Act, as with many US antitrust laws, include injunctive relief and the 
possibility of treble damages. In light of the WTO’s 1916 Act findings, Professor 
Matsushita has noted the possibility that WTO Members could challenge the 
Robinson-Patman Act as well, arguing that it covers dumping in that it regulates 
international price discrimination, and that thus it is covered by the Antidumping 
                                                 
57 Goss Graphic Systems was awarded treble damages in its suit against Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho (TKS), 
in a trial held in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. Although this 
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58 Mitsuo Matsushita and Douglas E Rosenthal, ‘Was the WTO Mistaken in Ruling on Antidumping 
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61 Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’ (2004) 3 
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62 15 U.S.C. s 13 et seq (1936). 
Agreement and the only permissible remedy for a breach is the imposition of 
antidumping duties.63 
Paul Stephan has more broadly critiqued the WTO’s failure to incorporate context 
into its analysis of disputes with an antitrust component: ‘The WTO has had little 
direct involvement with competition policy, but the few instances in which it has 
engaged these problems illustrate the shortcomings of international supervision of 
national competition law. In the Kodak-Fuji dispute, the WTO dispute settlement 
process rejected the claim that Japan’s tolerance of inefficient retail distribution 
networks, which impeded the entry of foreign products, constituted an impermissible 
trade barrier.’64 Stephan argues that the Appellate Body’s condemnation of the 1916 
Act as violating the Antidumping Agreement (ADA) further illustrates a misguided 
approach: ‘A symmetrical dispute involving US antitrust law reinforces the point . . . . 
This statute [the 1916 Act], as interpreted by the US courts, simply recapitulated the 
substantive requirements of a predatory pricing violation under the Sherman Act. No 
criminal or civil suit under the 1916 Act had ever succeeded.  But, because in form, 
the 1916 Act regulates dumping in a matter not authorized by the WTO agreements, 
the WTO condemned it as violating US obligations [under the ADA]’.65 Stephan 
attributes these findings as coming ‘at the cost of the substantive ends that these 
agreements purportedly pursue’.66 
Thus while the Appellate Body’s decision was in a sense quite safe in that it 
addressed the ‘chilling effect’ concerns of the petitioners while only impacting a law 
that was already moribund, it was also somewhat risky to import into the WTO realm 
a statute that, in context, had never been successfully invoked by plaintiffs; had never 
been invoked by government (but was nonetheless deemed ‘mandatory’); and which 
was situated with the antitrust laws and had the hallmarks of an antitrust statute. It 
would have better balanced context and object and purpose to treat the 1916 Act as 
discretionary and not susceptible to an as such challenge. Had the Appellate Body 
done so and litigation never advanced beyond preliminary stages under the Act, there 
would have been minimal impact to deferring to the national characterisation of the 
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Act and treating it as presumptively not targeted at dumping. If, however, the Goss 
litigation had arisen and proceeded as it did, an ‘as applied’ challenge could then have 
been brought, with no need to grapple with whether the Act could theoretically be 
used to remedy dumping. 
V. SAFEGUARDS 
Lastly, we turn to the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence in cases challenging the 
imposition of safeguard measures, for which it has been subject to some criticism.67 In 
particular, in a series of decisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Appellate 
Body, among other things, interpreted the Safeguards Agreement to require that the 
relevant increase in imports result from ‘unforeseen developments’ even though this 
language had been essentially read out of GATT Article XIX by GATT panels and 
does not appear in the Safeguards Agreement,68 and appeared to conflate correlation 
and causation, leading to confusion as to how to demonstrate the requisite causation.69 
During this period, every safeguards measure that was challenged in WTO dispute 
settlement was deemed to violate WTO rules.70 As a result, some questioned whether 
it would ever be possible to impose a WTO-consistent safeguard.71 
Presumably as a result of the jurisprudence described above, the imposition of 
safeguards dropped significantly among WTO Members after 2003.72 The number of 
safeguards measures imposed reached a peak of 15 in 2003, and then dropped off to 
between five and seven between 2004 and 2008. Following the global financial crisis, 
there have been peaks and troughs since 2009, with as few as four safeguards imposed 
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the World Trade Organization’ (2015) 13 Rich J Global L Bus 563, 572.  In the case of the United 
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(in 2010) and as many as 11 (in 2011).73 Over the period from 1 January 1996 through 
30 April 2014, the primary users of safeguards were developing countries, which 
accounted for over 90 percent of the measures imposed.74  However, this figure does 
not entirely capture the effect the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has had on previous 
users of safeguards. While the United States has always imposed duties in far more 
antidumping cases than it has imposed safeguards measures, it used to impose 
safeguards on a regular, albeit limited, basis. From 1996 to 2002, the US imposed a 
total of six safeguards, or almost one safeguard per year. Strikingly, since 2002 the 
US has not imposed a single safeguard measure.75 
The linkage between the US’s safeguards practice and the Appellate Body’s 
safeguards jurisprudence can be inferred even more strongly when one looks at the 
respondents in WTO safeguards disputes. Between 1997 and 2012, 43 WTO disputes 
were brought relating to the imposition of safeguard measures. Of these 43, the United 
States was the respondent in 15 cases, or 35 percent of all the disputes. However, all 
15 of the cases brought against the United States were initiated between 1997 and 
2002, a period during which 29 total safeguards disputes were initiated. Thus the 
United States went from being the respondent in over half of the safeguards cases 
brought between 1997 and 2002, to not imposing any safeguard measures and thus not 
being the subject of any further safeguards disputes from 2003 through the present.76 
The dramatic change in United States and other developed-country practice could 
be viewed as a positive. Safeguards are highly controversial because they entail a 
government imposing trade barriers on imports in the absence of any allegations of 
unfairness on the part of the importers.77 
However, one must keep in mind the context and object and purpose of the 
Agreement on Safeguards. In particular, one of the objectives of the Uruguay Round 
negotiators was to provide a limited framework in which it would be acceptable to 
provide temporary support to a domestic industry, while at the same time prohibiting 
previously used ‘grey market’ measures such as voluntary restraint agreements 
(VRAs), orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) and voluntary restraints on exports 
(VERs). The Agreement on Safeguards indeed prohibits the use of grey market 
measures in Article 11(1)(b), which provides that ‘a Member shall not seek, take or 
maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any 
similar measures on the export or import side’. While there is some uncertainty as to 
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why this was a high priority for the negotiators, 78  logical concerns could have 
included the fact that grey market arrangements are not formal treaties or agreements 
and as such are not transparent, and that powerful entities such as the United States 
and European Union could, and did, use their might to effectively impose grey market 
arrangements on their trading partners. 
So why allow any type of measure to protect domestic industry in the absence of 
‘unfair’ trade practices? Grey market measures and safeguards both serve the function 
of a safety valve: when political pressure becomes particularly intense to assist a 
domestic industry, these mechanisms provide a means to give a measure of assistance 
to said industry. There has long been a perceived need for such safety valves, 
notwithstanding their trade distorting effects, and it seems likely that the availability 
of some form of safety valve was an important consideration for countries considering 
whether to join the WTO with its more legalistic form of dispute settlement. Thus 
effectively shutting the safeguards safety valve has problematic implications. 
It is unlikely that Members such as the United States and others are simply 
withstanding the occasional intense political pressure to protect a domestic industry 
now that safeguards are essentially unavailable as a policy tool. Instead, they are 
probably reverting to the use of VRAs, VREs and OMAs, which the Safeguards 
Agreement prohibits.79 There are indicia that such measures have been used in recent 
years.80 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a WTO Member could or would police this 
violation of the Safeguards Agreement, because they have agreed to the breach 
themselves.81 
Thus when we consider the Agreement on Safeguards in context and in light of its 
object and purpose, we can see that negotiators were agreeing to a limited safety valve, 
alongside an agreement to cease grey-market measures. The consequence of the 
Appellate Body disregarding these real-world considerations is that the permissible 
safety valve is now going unused by the United States and many other developed 
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countries, and it is likely that in its stead, these Members are reverting to grey-market 
arrangements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the WTO is not the Free Trade 
Organization; it is instead a sophisticated system of managing trade. That system 
includes rules and mechanisms to remove or reduce trade barriers in many contexts. 
However, it also includes numerous provisions that permit various forms of 
government actions that are inconsistent with an unfettered free market. For example, 
the SPS and TBT Agreements allow Members, subject to certain conditions, to 
regulate to ensure the safety and healthfulness of imported foods and other products. 
Such regulations impede trade, because nonconforming goods will not be permitted 
into the regulating Member’s territory. Nonetheless, the Members of the WTO, and 
the GATT signatories before them, determined that food and product safety were 
legitimate domestic objectives, and that they would therefore accept some policy 
space to regulate to achieve these objectives, even at the expense of some trade. The 
trade remedies provisions can also be seen as a form of managing trade.82 The WTO 
contains entire agreements that permit, albeit with parameters, the use of trade 
remedies because a number of key participants in the international trading system 
were not willing to commit to the GATT/WTO trade liberalisation measures and 
limitations on national autonomy unless they could retain the right to employ certain 
safety valves. 
While other participants would have preferred bans on such safety valves, or at 
least stringent limitations on their use, they recognised that some safety valves are 
harder to regulate than others, and as such there was some value to elaborating 
specified permissible safety valves, particularly if the alternative were no WTO at all. 
In the give and take of trade negotiations, these compromises were struck in the form 
of the Antidumping Agreement, Safeguards Agreement, and Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. These agreements should be read and understood in 
this context. Some types of safety valves were explicitly forbidden, such as voluntary 
export restraints and orderly market arrangements (in the Safeguards Agreement) and 
the granting of remedies for dumping other than antidumping duties (in the 
Antidumping Agreement), but in exchange, some remained. 
Although there would likely be broad agreement with the proposition that the 
WTO’s trade remedies agreements reflect a set of compromises designed to permit the 
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use of some safety valves without issuing a blank check, it would be overly simplistic 
to suggest that each WTO Member had a perfect understanding of exactly what the 
intended meaning was of each article of every Covered Agreement. To the contrary, 
to reach consensus over treaty text — not just in the trade context but in many forms 
of international negotiations — often necessitates using language that is vague, 
subject to multiple interpretations, or otherwise less than clear. In these circumstances 
within the WTO, dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body may be required to 
determine the meaning of provisions that may have been drafted to be imprecise or 
unclear. Nonetheless, the panels and Appellate Body have guidance in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding and VCLT. Part of the context and the object and purpose 
has to be to understand that the trade remedies were permitted so that Members would 
have agreed-to safety valves available to them if they felt it politically imperative to 
deviate from a hands-off, free trade approach under certain circumstances. The 
Appellate Body has complicated matters by disregarding the context that gave rise to 
the trade remedies agreements and their object and purpose. 
The Appellate Body has navigated difficult terrain in its first twenty years, and is 
in general to be commended for positioning the WTO dispute settlement system as the 
‘jewel in the crown’ of the WTO.83 The Appellate Body’s role is a challenging one; it 
is expected to refrain from judicial activism while maintaining an awareness of the 
systemic implications of its actions. While the Appellate Body has generally 
navigated these roles with only limited critiques from WTO Members and academic 
commentators, a subset of the antidumping and safeguards disputes have been more 
controversial. In a number of these cases, the Appellate Body has reached outcomes 
that Members would in the main applaud – because they would like to see more 
disciplines on the use of trade remedies in general – but that nonetheless raise some 
systemic concerns due to the substantive analysis or the flow-on implications thereof. 
It is probably unrealistic to expect an Appellate Body comprised of generalists, 
selected by a somewhat politicised process, to always be able to resolve cases 
involving highly technical subject matter in a manner that in the main satisfies the 
WTO Membership while neither adding to, nor diminishing the rights and obligations 
of Members provided by the covered agreements.84 However, the Appellate Body has, 
particularly in some of the antidumping and safeguards disputes, perhaps erred too far 
in favour of appeasing the majority at the expense of a faithful Vienna Convention 
analysis of what the agreements do and do not permit.  While these interpretive 
choices may appear to be largely victimless, if nothing else, the main ‘victim’ the 
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United States, is likely to insist on more clarity and less interpretive leeway in all 
future trade remedies-related negotiations within the WTO. Given the gulf that 
already existed between the US and many other Members on these topics, such 
negotiations promise to be exceedingly challenging. 
